Contingency, Freedom, and Classical Liberalism by Curtis, William M.
 




Contingency, Freedom, and Classical Liberalism










William M. Curtis, « Contingency, Freedom, and Classical Liberalism », European Journal of Pragmatism
and American Philosophy [Online], XII-2 | 2020, Online since 14 December 2020, connection on 15
December 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/2193  ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/
ejpap.2193 
This text was automatically generated on 15 December 2020.
Author retains copyright and grants the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy right
of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Contingency, Freedom, and Classical
Liberalism
Calcaterra and Rorty’s Politics
William M. Curtis
1 Rosa Calcaterra has written an extremely learned and thoughtful book about Richard
Rorty’s controversial neopragmatism. It is a worthy addition to the growing number of
works  that  offer  a  more  generous  and  balanced  assessment  of  Rorty’s  thought,  in
contrast to the scores of highly critical treatments it received during his career. But, as
Calcaterra insists,  her  book is  “not  an apology for  Rorty” (Calcaterra 2019:  ix);  she
critically approaches what she calls Rorty’s philosophical “provocations,” especially his
conceptions  of  contingency  and  normativity,  to  see  how  they  might  inspire  fresh
thinking.  Calcaterra  examines  these  provocations  by  setting  them in  historical  and
philosophical  context,  relating Rortyan themes to the work of  his  many influences,
which range the gamut from the classical pragmatists – Peirce, James, and Dewey – to
Continental thinkers – Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and their postmodernist successors
– to analytic philosophers, including Wittgenstein, Sellars, Quine, Davidson, and, more
surprisingly,  Carnap.  What  emerges  is  a  nuanced  vision  of  Rorty’s  multifarious
intellectual project, and it is an impressive feat that Calcaterra accomplishes this in a
fairly slim volume.
2 Coming  to  Rorty  as  a  political  theorist,  I  was  especially  intrigued  by  Calcaterra’s
treatment of his political thought. This might be surprising, since she announces in the
preface that she doesn’t examine this aspect of his work (Calcaterra 2019: xiv)! In truth,
she does discuss Rorty’s conception of liberalism, though she refrains from analyzing
his  professed  commitment  to  egalitarian  social  democracy.  On  one  hand,  this  is  a
perfectly  legitimate  authorial  choice  to  make;  no  single  volume  can  explore  every
aspect of Rorty’s thought, so it is inevitable that some topics will be left out. As her title
indicates,  Calcaterra  focuses  on  Rorty’s  conception  of  contingency  –  his
“contingentism,” which insists that all of our descriptions of the world are in some
sense  optional  –  and  its  (fraught)  relationship  to  normativity.  On  the  other  hand,
Calcaterra knows that an array of critics on the Left, from Deweyan democrats to post-
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Marxist radicals, find Rorty’s politics complacent and retrograde. Since Calcaterra is so
perceptive in her examination of Rorty’s contingentism, and because his political ideal,
which he famously dubs “liberal utopia,” is the pragmatic, normative counterpart to
his  contingentism, I  found myself  wanting to hear her thoughts about the political
controversy that followed him. 
3 In a classic 1994 article,  Richard Shusterman suggests that Rorty’s contingentism is
concomitant to an emphasis on negative liberty that is in tension with his advocacy of
an old Left, social democratic politics.1 This tension is what many of his leftist critics
are  ultimately  reacting  to.  Calcaterra  discusses  one  of  these  critics,  feminist
philosopher  Nancy  Fraser,  and  hints  that  both  Fraser  and  John  Dewey  offer  more
theoretical resources than Rorty to resist and criticize what Fraser deems neoliberal
individualism  (Calcaterra  2019:  107-8).  Further,  in  one  of  the  most  intriguing
discussions  in  the  book,  Calcaterra  argues  that  Rorty  offers  a  “new  pragmatic
anthropology”  that  conceives  of  human  beings  as  linguistic  agents  whose  most
important  feature  is  that  we can use  language  as  a  “tool  of  tools”  to  create  novel
purposes and ways of being (Calcaterra 2019: 108-28). In this she agrees with Robert
Brandom’s  interpretation  of  Rorty’s  liberalism,  which  in  turn  has  affinities  with
Shusterman’s argument that Rorty, perhaps in spite of his avowed policy preferences,
emphasizes an individualistic negative liberty that arguably renders Rorty’s liberalism
akin to a pragmatic, free-market, classical liberalism. In other words, on this reading,
Fraser is right: Rorty’s political thought does not support a deeply egalitarian social
democracy.  His  enthusiastic  endorsement  of  radical  contingentism,  aestheticized
individual self-creation, and of the radical pluralism that results from our experimental
uses  of  negative  liberty  in  the  private  sphere  is  ultimately  incompatible  with  the
egalitarianism espoused by the academic Left. Obviously, Rorty is a far cry from a social
Darwinist, but then even the modern classical liberalism of F.A. Hayek insists upon a
humane welfare safety net. Is Rorty best read as a crypto-Hayekian? Perhaps we should
ignore  Rorty’s  self-identification  with  the  old  Left  and  recognize  that  his  intense
commitment to individual liberty and the dynamic cultural innovation that it produces
means he is better characterized as a pragmatic classical liberal. 
4 I  attempt  to  sketch  this  proposition  below and would  be  interested  to  know what
Calcaterra might make of  it  because she is  that  rarest  of  things:  a  careful  and fair
reader  of  Rorty’s  work.  But  I  will  build  to  this  sketch  by  first  discussing  one  of
Calcaterra’s many interesting criticisms of Rorty. She suggests that Rorty’s conception
of  contingentism  could  have  been  rendered  more  plausible  if  he  had  been  more
attentive to Peirce’s related concept of “tychism.” Tychism, Calcaterra tells us, is “the
ontological-metaphysical hypothesis according to which the occurrence of chance is a
real factor among natural phenomena” (Calcaterra 2019: 123). Rorty, however, tends to
be dismissive of Peirce, and Calcaterra surmises that Rorty rejects tychism because his
neopragmatist  contingentism  prevents  him  from  invoking  ontological-metaphysical
hypotheses that purport to identify fundamental, and thus privileged, characteristics of
reality. Calcaterra observes that “Rorty prohibits himself from using the vocabulary of
metaphysics  and  he  certainly  has  good  reasons  for  taking  such  a  stance,  since  he
identifies metaphysics with foundationalism and authoritarianism” (ibid.).  She poses
the  pertinent  question,  however,  of  whether  “Rorty’s  contingentism  is  itself  a
metaphysical  construction,”  and  remarks  a  consideration  of  tychism  might  have
induced  him  to  address  this  crucial  issue.  As  she  puts  it,  “Peirce’s  tychism  might
provide an interesting theoretical integration of the issues at stake in the ethical claim
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accompanying Rorty’s critique of the absolutistic implication of modern metaphysics”
(ibid.). Calcaterra insists that there is nothing authoritarian about the metaphysics of
tychism; embracing something like it may have saved Rorty from accusations that he is
confused about the metaphysical nature of contingency.
5 Interestingly, Rorty does refer to tychism in at least one place in his opus. In “The
Continuity Between the Enlightenment and ‘Postmodernism’,” Rorty writes:
The  attempt  to  synthesize  Hegel  and  Darwin  into  a  syncretic  evolutionary  and
historicist world-view led philosophers away from [the historical determinism of]
Marx and Spencer in the direction of what Peirce called “tychism” – an emphasis on
the  role  of  chance  in  determining  the  course  of  both  biological  and  cultural
evolution […] On a tychistic view of evolution, you cannot extrapolate from the past
to the future. You cannot do with History what the Enlightenment tried to do with
Nature. You cannot get it right, once and for all. All you can do is use the tools
available in the present to make the future different than it might have been. You
can practice utopian politics but you cannot back up your politics by reference to
what History dictates. You cannot use philosophy to underwrite your utopia […]
This de-rationalized and tychistic version of evolution produced, at the end of the
nineteenth century, the great forerunner of “postmodernism”: Nietzsche. It  also
produced the founders of American pragmatism: James and Dewey. (Rorty 2001: 30)
6 To Peirce fans, Rorty’s quick reference to tychism, positive though it is, will be seen as
more of his insouciant name-dropping; indeed, he even adds insult to injury in the final
sentence  by  conspicuously  excluding  Peirce  from  the  “founders  of  American
pragmatism!” Calcaterra would no doubt repeat that Rorty here fails to take advantage
of the opportunity to further explore tychism, which could improve his contingentism.
7 Perhaps. Rorty, though, might have impishly replied that the title of Calcaterra’s book
has its terms reversed: it should be Normativity and Contingency. This is because Rorty’s
fundamental  commitment  is  to  his  normative  ideal:  liberal  utopia.  His  other
commitments – to contingentism, naturalism, historicism, the “linguistic turn,” and
the rest of the farrago of concepts he endorses – are all in the service of his liberal
politics. This leads him to make the philosophically scandalous claim, as he does in an
article tellingly entitled “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy,” that we should put
politics  first  and then tailor  a  philosophy to  suit  it  (Rorty  1991:  178).  He  proposes
contingentism  because  he  thinks  it  bests  suits  liberal  utopia.  A  technical,
metaphysically-burdened idea like tychism, however, likely didn’t strike Rorty as an
auspicious intellectual tool for the advancement of his pragmatic liberalism.
8 “The  Continuity  Between  the  Enlightenment  and  ‘Postmodernism’”  is  an  excellent
example of Rorty’s modus operandi. In it, he urges that we separate the “philosophical
Enlightenment project” – the project to identify necessary metaphysical foundations
for  knowledge  –  from the  “political  Enlightenment  project,”  the  practical  effort  to
“create heaven on earth, a world without caste, class, or cruelty” (Rorty 2001: 19). The
former  project  seeks  to  replace  the  metaphysical  authority  of  pre-Enlightenment
religion with modern science,  which becomes the gold standard for what counts as
genuine  knowledge.  Rorty,  however,  encourages  us  to  dispense  with  metaphysical
authorities altogether, and worries that the philosophical Enlightenment project leads
to scientism: the privileging of science over other cultural endeavors on the grounds
that it most accurately describes reality. While Rorty is a proponent of the naturalism,
the Baconian technological fruits, and even of the liberal moral example provided by
the practice of modern science at its best, scientism has sent philosophers scurrying to
find metaphysical foundations for morality and politics that are philosophically secure
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in  the  context  of  the  scientific  worldview  that  conspicuously  lacks  sources  of
normativity.  Rorty,  however,  thinks  this  scurrying  is  both  unnecessary  and  also
politically  dangerous.  It  is  unnecessary  because  “liberal  democracy  can  get  along
without philosophical presuppositions” (Rorty 1991: 179). It is dangerous because, as
Calcaterra  notes,  metaphysical  foundations,  which  are  meant  to  be  necessary  and
irrefutable,  are  authoritarian.  (The  philosophical  “scientific”  pretensions  of  Soviet
Marxist-Leninism, for example, leap to mind.) We should carry on the Enlightenment
political  project  but  drop  the  philosophical  search  for  foundations.  For  Rorty,  this
means practicing a reformist, liberal politics, since the other major post-Enlightenment
options,  communism  and  fascism,  proved  abysmal  failures.  Moreover,  eschewing
metaphysical claims, we should conceive of this politics and our commitment to it as
products of historical contingency, matters of chance and luck. Ideally, this frees us to
be more creative in our political problem solving because the course of our politics is
not  predetermined  by  metaphysics  or  history.  Although  critics  worry  that  “mere”
contingency will not motivate people to be devoted to liberal values, Rorty insists that
“a belief can still regulate action, can still be thought worth dying for, among people
who  are  quite  aware  that  this  belief  is  caused  by  nothing  deeper  than  contingent
historical circumstance” (Rorty 1989: 189).
9 Needless  to  say,  Rorty’s  gambit  is  controversial  among philosophers,  who typically
accuse him of abandoning serious philosophical argument for frivolous relativism. In
their view, there is little more to Rorty’s liberalism than a bald claim that we should be
liberals because “that’s just what we do around here.” His efforts to engage nonliberals
amount to the exhortation, “Try liberalism, you’ll like it!” This, critics claim, is all one
can say if one’s normative commitments are a product of historical contingency. As
Calcaterra  knows,  however,  such  characterizations  of  Rorty’s  project  are  facile.
Contingentism  does  not  leave  him  so  inarticulate  in  his  promotion  of  liberalism.
Instead, Rorty says we should persuasively describe the good features of liberal society
to show how it is better than possible alternatives, how these features cohere and can
be  improved,  and  how liberal  society  has  the  resources  to  manage  and resolve  its
inevitable  flaws  (see,  e.g.,  Rorty  1989:  57).  This  includes  telling  Whiggish  historical
narratives that emphasize the progress that liberal society has made over its historical
predecessors, how it has become less cruel and more inclusive. Rorty does this in “The
Continuity  Between  the  Enlightenment  and  ‘Postmodernism’,”  arguing  that  the
Enlightenment, at its best, undermined the idea that human beings must be obedient to
a nonhuman authority (whose dictates are interpreted and enforced by authoritarian
humans) and ushered in the potential for a mature, humanistic morality focused on
democratic human flourishing. In Calcaterra’s words, this is “the search for self-reliance
that modernity held in jarring contrast with the foundational instances that it itself
carried  on  through  the  search  for  extra-temporal  epistemic  and  moral  criteria”
(Calcaterra 2019: 126). Ceasing the latter search will enhance our self-reliance so that
we may more freely pursue a better future.
10 Since Rorty importantly connects  liberal  politics  with contingentism, I  was initially
perplexed  by  Calcaterra’s  intention  to  put  the  political  aspects  of  Rorty’s  work
“deliberately aside” in order to focus on “the relationship between contingentism and
normativity” (Calcaterra 2019: xiv). I found myself wondering how one could neglect
Rorty’s political project and do justice to this relationship. I was buoyed to discover
that  Calcaterra  does  discuss  Rorty’s  liberalism  at  several  points  in  the  book,
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particularly in chapters 4-6. She clearly recognizes the import of Rorty’s slogan: “Take
care of freedom and truth will take care of itself.” (Calcaterra 2019: 116). 
11 Indeed,  Calcaterra  suggests  that  Rorty  offers  a  “new pragmatic  anthropology”  that
bolsters his post-foundationalist liberalism. She writes that this anthropology focuses
“on the picture of human beings as linguistic agents: as beings who enjoy by their own
nature the capability of using different vocabularies and, at the same time, of looking
for languages progressively more suitable to the organization of their living situation.
As a consequence, human freedom becomes an internal function of our very ability of
using language for managing our own constraints and potentialities.” (Calcaterra 2019:
119). This is insightful and well put, and tracks with Robert Brandom’s discussion of
Rorty’s pragmatism. Brandom asserts that “Linguistic norms are special, in that being
constrained by them gives us a distinctive sort of freedom […] [This constraint] enables
one  to  make  and  understand  an  indefinite  number  of  novel  claims,  formulate  an
indefinite number of novel concepts, frame an indefinite number of novel purposes,
and so on, subjecting oneself to constraint by the norms implicit in a vocabulary at the
same time confers unparaleled [sic] freedom – that is, freedom to do things one could
not only not do before, but could not even want to do.” (Brandom 2000: 177-8). 
12 What Brandom infers from this is provocative: “What really matters about us morally,
and  so  ultimately,  politically  is  not  ultimately  to  be  understood  in  terms  of  goals
available from the inevitably reductive perspective of the naturalist: paradigmatically
the avoidance of mammalian pain. […] It is our capacity to transform the vocabularies
in which we live and move and have our being, and so to create new ways of being (for
creatures like ourselves). Our moral worth is our dignity as potential contributors to
the Conversation […] And for that reason pain, and various sorts of social and economic
deprivation,  have  a  second-hand,  but  nonetheless  genuine  moral  significance.”
(Brandom  2000:  178).  Brandom  concludes  that  the  primary  goal  of  our  political
institutions  should  be  to  nurture  and  secure  the  “minimal  necessary  conditions  of
access  to  the Conversation” and that  “our overarching public purpose should be to
ensure that a hundred flowers bloom, and a hundred novel schools of thought contend”
(Brandom 2000: 178-9). 
13 In response, Rorty applauds this interpretation of pragmatic liberalism but warns that
it leaves Brandom “open to the same accusations of pseudo-aristocratic condescension
and ivory-tower aestheticism as are frequently leveled at me” (Rorty 2000: 189). Indeed,
Brandom’s discussion embraces the controversial “public-private divide” that is central
to  Rorty’s  conception  of  liberalism.  As  readers  of  Rorty’s  Contingency,  Irony,  and
Solidarity (1989) know, Rorty suggests that liberal societies feature two primary spheres
of activity that are incommensurable and cannot be reduced to one another: a public
sphere where we cultivate communal solidarity and prioritize the goal of minimizing
cruelty  and  the  unnecessary  suffering  it  produces,  and  a  private  sphere  in  which
individuals are free to pursue their own diverse visions of the good life. Rorty’s leftist
critics  typically  charge  him  with  focusing  on  the  latter  at  the  expense  former.
Consequently, Rorty spent the last two decades of his life deflecting accusations that
his emphasis on private, Nietzschean, self-creation, carried out in the framework of
liberal political community, is elitist and politically conservative. Although he endorsed
the economic egalitarianism of social democracy and praised the New Left for pushing
liberal  politics  to  further  diminish  societal  cruelty,  he  failed  to  convince  his  many
leftist critics that he was truly committed to modern social justice. He arguably puts
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much  more  energy  and  characteristic  flair  into  his  writings  about  his  beloved
intellectual  innovators  and  the  freedom  they  require  than  he  does  in  his  bland
discussions of egalitarian politics. Hence the suspicion that he is politically heretical.
14 Calcaterra doesn’t straightforwardly reveal whether she shares this suspicion, and I
assume this is what she means when she says she won’t engage with Rorty’s politics.
She  does,  however,  astutely  discuss  Rorty’s  liberal  public-private  divide.  Calcaterra
writes that Rorty “tries to present the cohabitation of public and private,  not their
absolute  incommunicability:  a  cohabitation  that  lacks  predetermined  schemes  and
should be judged on the basis of the concrete improvements it will produce on both
levels” (Calcaterra 2019: 106-7). This is exactly right (and missed by critics like Fraser),
and the distinction between activities that are matters of public concern, and those
best left to private individual choice, is itself subject to debate and evolution as we use
our  freedom to  experiment  with  new activities,  and  publicly  discuss  whether  they
might need to be regulated if they produce any harms. As Rorty admits, he’s really just
updating J.S. Mill (Rorty 2010).
15 Calcaterra also presents the leftist  critique of  Rorty’s  liberalism by contrasting him
with  Nancy  Fraser  and John Dewey.  She  writes,  “Similarly  to  Nancy  Fraser,  Dewey
claims a radical democracy is able to contrast with the most disturbing consequences of
American  capitalism”  (Calcaterra  2019:  108).  She  suggests  that  Dewey  would  have
sympathized  with  Fraser’s  concern  that,  “In  a  cruel  twist  of  fate,  I  fear  that  the
movement for women’s liberation has become entangled in a dangerous liaison with
neoliberal efforts to build a free-market society. That would explain how it came to
pass that feminist ideas that once formed part of a radical worldview are increasingly
expressed in individualistic  terms.”  (Calcaterra 2019:  108,  quoting Fraser  2013).  For
Fraser,  Rorty’s  liberal  individualism  is  indicative  of  the  problem  (see  Fraser  1989:
93-111). It is true that Rorty shows little interest in “radical democracy,” and while he
would resist the accusation that he is complicit in neoliberal efforts to build a free-
market society, this is Fraser’s charge. While Calcaterra does not express agreement
with this, neither does she defend Rorty from it.
16 I  want  to  suggest  that  he  doesn’t  need  defending  because  he  shouldn’t  resist  the
accusation. Fraser is correct insofar as she finds that Rorty’s emphasis on the negative
liberty  of  individuals  in  the  private  sphere  dovetails  with a  version of  free-market
classical  liberalism. (I  purposely avoid the Fraser’s  term, “neoliberalism”; it  has too
much vagueness and baggage.) Shusterman highlights Rorty’s commitment to negative
liberty and, like Calcaterra, contrasts it with Dewey’s less individualistic, more positive
freedom-oriented democratic theory. Moreover, Shusterman argues that a source of
this difference comes from Rorty’s more radical contingentism. Shusterman observes:
If Dewey’s utopia “aims to harmonize the development of each individual with the
maintenance of a social state in which the activities of one will contribute to the
good  of  all  the  others”  so  that  very  different  individual  self-fulfillments  can
contribute to “a fund of shared values,” Rorty more modestly and negatively wants
to leave individuals to their own devices, whatever (and however meager) they be.
He sees “the aim of a just and free society as letting its citizens be as privatistic,
‘irrationalist,’ and aestheticist as they please so long as they do it on their own time
– causing no harm to others,” and as trying “to equalize opportunities for self-
creation  and  then  leave  people  alone  to  use  or  neglect  their
opportunities.” (Shusterman 1994: 396; citations omitted)
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17 Shusterman proceeds to illuminate the contrast between the Hegelian, neo-republican
Dewey and the neo-Nietzschean, classically liberal Rorty. Dewey insists that democratic
political  participation is  necessary for his  ethical  ideal  of  “growth.” As Shusterman
elaborates, Dewey and Rorty both value the development of the individuality of every
member  of  a  community,  but  in  Dewey’s  democratic  vision  there  is  simply  more
harmony and a more obvious link between ethical individuality and the common good.
His analogizing of democratic politics to the scientific method is illustrative: ideally, for
Dewey, democratic politics proceeds like debates among scientists in the process of
experimental  problem solving.  But,  as  critics  are quick to point out,  the analogy is
weak:  democratic  debates  over  the  common  good  are  not  like  the  debates  among
specially-trained experts who mostly agree about what problems they are working on
and  what  counts  as  solutions.  There  simply  isn’t  the  same  degree  of  practical
homogeneity or unity of purpose in a modern democratic community as there is in the
scientific  community.  Critics  infer  that  Deweyan  democracy  cannot  tolerate  and  is
therefore oppressive of the deep ethical pluralism that modern democracies contain,
and which Rorty’s liberalism seeks to foster (see, e.g., Talisse 2007: 27-53). 
18 In contrast with Dewey’s more organic conception of democratic community that, as
Shusterman and Calcaterra  note,  opposes  a  public-private  dichotomy,  Rorty  argues
“that self-realization must therefore lie in maximizing one’s distinctive idiosyncrasy by
highlighting  the  particular  contingent  differences  that  distinguish  us  from  other
members of our community and by confining our efforts of self-creation to the private
sphere,  […]”  (Shusterman  1994:  400).  Shusterman  concludes,  “To  sum  up,  Rorty’s
radicalization of  contingency engenders  a  far  more narrowly individualistic  idea of
self-realization than Dewey’s” (Shusterman 1994: 399). 
19 These points form the beginning of larger defense of Rorty as a pragmatic classical
liberal  that  cannot  be  carried out  here.  But  a  précis  might  go something like  this:
according to Calcaterra and Brandom’s interpretation of Rorty’s pragmatic liberalism,
freedom is  a  matter  of  individuals  being  able  to  engage  in  experimental  linguistic
behavior; this is why Rorty says that what matters for freedom is that you are able to
express  yourself  without  getting  hurt  (Rorty  1989:  176).  While  severe  social  and
economic deprivation can diminish a person’s capacity as a “linguistic agent,” it is not
clear that the high degree of economic egalitarianism, produced through high levels of
redistribution, that leftist politics typically demands is necessary to enable all citizens
to be free. If,  in Brandom’s phrase, the “minimal necessary conditions” for freedom
simply entail a reasonable welfare safety net and a good school system, in addition to a
few other public goods accepted by classical liberals, like internal and external security
to ensure our negative rights, then it would seem that Rorty’s liberalism is simpatico
with a version of classical liberalism like Hayek’s, with its robust, experimental market
freedom in the private sphere. 
20 Indeed, it’s the corollary of minimizing economic redistribution that Rorty’s liberalism
arguably  requires:  a  greater  range  of  individual  experiments  can take  place  in  the
private sphere because of the greater economic inequality that a classical liberal society
contains  relative  to  a  more  highly  egalitarian  society,  which  is  by  definition  more
economically  homogeneous.  There is  a  tradeoff  between Rorty’s  two values that  he
never fully  grapples  with in its  economic dimension:  between egalitarian economic
public  policy,  and  the  diversity  of  life  experiments  in  the  private  realm.
Oversimplifying the mind-bogglingly complex economic ecosystem, we can say that if
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we narrow the range of economic inequality in a society through redistribution from
rich to poor, we prevent the experimentation that would have taken place outside of
the egalitarian range. Egalitarians would claim that this is fine and just:  even if  we
appreciated  the  life  experiments  of  the  relatively  rich  (there  is,  of  course,  a  long
tradition on the Left to despise the values and lives of the bourgeoisie), the lives of the
relatively  poor lived below the egalitarian range should not  be  permitted in  a  just
society (at least in the absence of a meaningfully free choice to live below the range).
But if Rorty is committed to letting more flowers bloom, shouldn’t he desire the wider,
more  economically  inegalitarian  range  of  experiments,  provided that  an  adequate,
cruelty-reducing, welfare safety net is in place? This would seem to be consistent with
Brandom’s suggestion that the latter is of “second-hand” if still genuine importance
relative to (negative) linguistic freedom. As we saw above, Rorty writes, in a very un-
Deweyan line, that “the aim of a just society” is “letting its citizens be as privatistic,
‘irrationalist,’ and aestheticist as they please so long as they do it on their own time –
causing no harm to others and using no resources needed by those less advantaged”
(Rorty 1989: xiv). Rorty here comes close to recognizing the tension and tradeoff. I have
applied the slippery modifiers  “reasonable” and “adequate” to  “welfare  safety  net”
above, and Rorty would likely protest that for him this does mean very high, leftist
levels of redistribution. But given his passionate emphasis on Berlinian negative liberty
and pluralism in the private sphere, it seems plausible to interpret him as a pragmatic
classical liberal. 
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NOTES
1. Robert Westbrook concurs, writing that “Rorty’s politics is centered on negative liberty, ‘our
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